Most notably for consumers, the IRA provides clean vehicle tax credits of up to $7,500 for new vehicles, IRA § 13401, and up to $4,000 for used vehicles, § 13402. It also eliminates a 200,000 vehicles per manufacturer cap, that was barring some companies—such as Tesla, Toyota, and General Motors—from benefiting fully from electric-vehicle tax incentives. Id. § 13401.
High-income earners are barred from claiming both credits. For the new vehicles, the credit is limited to couples making less than $300,000, and individuals earning less than $150,000. For used vehicles, the limits are $150,000 for couples and $75,000 for individuals. The clean vehicle credit is limited by the actual retail price of the vehicle: it cannot be used to purchase vans, SUVs, or pick-up trucks retailing above $80,000 or any other vehicles retailing above $55,000.
The IRA also takes many steps to secure the American electric vehicle supply chain, and puts stringent eligibility limits based on where battery components are manufactured or the underlying critical minerals are processed or mined. For instance, the Clean Vehicle Credits can only be redeemed when the new vehicles meet certain critical mineral requirements. A percentage of the value of the critical minerals in the battery must be extracted or processed in countries with which the U.S.has either (1) a free trade agreement in effect, or (2) recycled in North America. In 2023, this percentage starts at 40% and rises 10% each year until 2027 at which point the percentage will remain steady at 80%. The IRA imposes similar requirements on battery components, allowing the Clean Vehicle Credit to be redeemed only when the percentage of the battery value of the components manufactured or assembled in North America meets a certain percentage, which starts at 50% in 2023, and increases 10% each year until reaching 100% in 2029. The IRA also bars any application of the Clean Vehicle Credit to cars with battery components or critical minerals sourced from a "foreign entity of concern," starting in 2024 and 2025 respectively. [1]
These restrictions are likely to prove problematic for critical minerals produced in China, and Sen.manchin < ahrfss/www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/manchin-supports-万博体育app手机登录决策人劝阻公司在中国进一步投资并鼓励家庭生产。例如,上年末下院以压倒性
Recognizing the potential supply constraints caused by the battery and mineral sourcing limitations, the IRA also implements a variety of measures to promote domestic manufacturing of electric vehicles and battery supply chains. For instance, the Advanced Energy Project Credit, which provides investment tax credits for projects that equip or expand manufacturing facilities producing specified renewable energy equipment, is revised and expanded to encompass electric and hybrid vehicles production. IRA § 13501. The base credit is 6%, but an increase 30% rate is available if prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements are met. Id. Additionally, the IRA makes a $1 billion investment in clean heavy-duty vehicles, IRA § 60101, provides $2 billion in grants to retool existing auto manufacturing facilities to manufacture clean vehicles, § 50143, and expands the Department of Energy's lending authorities under the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing ("ATVM") program, § 50142. In the past, the ATVM loan program has successfully catalyzed domestic electric vehicle production, most famously by supporting Tesla with a $465 million loan in January 2010. Finally, the IRA takes steps to decarbonize the federal government's own fleet of vehicles, providing up to $3 billion to electrify Postal Service delivery trucks. IRA § 70002.
If enacted, these measures are sure to reshape and define the electric vehicle landscape.
[1] Foreign Entity of Concern, is defined by reference to the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, 42 U.S.C.§1871和手段:外国实体国务大臣根据标题8第1189(a)节指定为外国恐怖主义组织列入财政部外国资产控制局维护的专用国民和阻塞者清单(通称SDN链表)受覆盖国外国政府拥有、控制或受管辖或指令约束(按标题10第2533cd节定义)D) 被总检察长指称参与活动,并依据-i第18章第37章(通称Espionage法)定罪951或1030标题18标题18第90章(通称1996年经济渗透法)武器出口管制法(22 U.S.C.2751等)1954年原子能法第224、225、226、227或236节2274 2275 2276 2277 和222842018年出口管制改革法(50 U.S.C.4801等)或国际紧急经济权法1701等)或(E)由秘书经与国防部长和国家情报局局长协商判定从事有损美国国家安全或外交政策的未经授权行为
In the July 14 memorandum, Commerce seeks information about the: (1) amount of investment necessary to construct and start-up certain facilities, (2) non-financial barriers (e.g., access to inputs, qualified technical employees, technologies, research and development, etc.) that companies typically face to establish and begin certain operations, and (3) research and development ("R&D") expenses associated with conducting certain operations. These types of facilities/operations involved in:
- refining silicon into solar-grade polysilicon,
- producing ingots from solar-grade polysilicon,
- producing wafers from solar-grade ingots,
- producing solar cells from wafers,
- producing solar modules from solar cells, and
- the same operations and products as foreign producers and exporters responding to Commerce's solar circumvention inquiries.
The agency is particularly concerned with facilities located, and operations performed, in mainland China, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, or Vietnam, but would accept information pertaining to other countries.
Commerce is required to consider the level of investment and R&D expenses where circumvention is alleged due to assembly in a third country. Level of investment and R&D expenses are factors that statutorily must be considered when Commerce assesses whether the processing occurring in Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam is "minor or insignificant."[2] It is therefore important that interested parties provide Commerce with the requested information by the fast-approaching deadline of July 21st.
Commerce has requested this information only from "interested parties" in the solar circumvention inquiries which are defined under Commerce's rules to include foreign producers and U.S.Covington完全可以帮助客户响应商务请求提供事实信息或对商业规避查询有更广泛问题瑞格公元前19 0712022.
s1677j(b)(2).While the proposed rules would represent a positive development for foreign manufacturers, U.S.进口商和美国消费者,包括美国太阳项目开发产业,如果以当前形式发布,修改规则是可能的。因此,商务悬疑查询方必须在2022年8月1日之前提交评论 。
The proposed rules directly respond to President Biden's June 6, 2022 emergency declaration, which found that an emergency exists "with respect to the threats to the availability of sufficient electricity generation capacity" and authorized Commerce to issue a moratorium on tariffs on solar cells and modules from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam for up to a 24-month period.[4]
The Proposed Rules
The proposed rules appear to respond to concerns raised by the solar project development industry about how the emergency declaration would be implemented in the context of existing agency regulations. Commerce has confirmed that it intends to provide for the temporary, duty-free importation of certain solar cells and modules from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam even if Commerce determines that they are circumventing an existing AD/CVD order. In so doing, Commerce has clarified that these new rules—and not the agency's existing circumvention regulations—will apply to such solar cells and modules throughout the pendency of the emergency period.
The proposed rules would be codified as a new part 362 to title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and they would provide that:
- The applicable entries would be those "Southeast Asian-Completed Cells and Modules" that are subject to the solar circumvention inquiries. "Southeast Asian-Completed Cells and Modules" means solar cells and modules completed in Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, or Vietnam, using parts and components that are made in China and "subsequently exported from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand or Vietnam to the United States."
- The date of termination of the temporary duty-free importation would be June 6, 2024, or the date when the emergency is terminated, whichever occurs first.
- Importation of Southeast Asian-Completed Cells and Modules would be "free of collection" of AD/CVD cash deposits until the termination date of the emergency.
- In the event of an affirmative preliminary or final circumvention determination prior to the date of termination, Commerce would not direct U.S.Customs and Border Protection to suspend liquidation or collect cash deposits. This means that Southeast Asian-Completed Cells and Modules imported at any time prior to the termination of the emergency would not be subject to AD/CVD duties as a result of an affirmative determination in the circumvention inquiries.
- In the event that it issues an affirmative preliminary circumvention determination, Commerce has signaled that it may require certifications for solar cells and modules from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam in order to differentiate between (i) Southeast Asian modules with Chinese cells that are already subject to the existing orders and (ii) Southeast Asian modules using Chinese inputs that would become subject to the existing orders solely based upon an affirmative circumvention finding. This certification process would likely create an administrative burden for U.S.进口商
a美国成员太阳能电池制造行业Auxin Solar公司请求绕行查询,因此可能有兴趣对受影响的进口品保持高关税。商业有义务考虑所有提交的评论并可能根据这些评论修改拟议规则。 机构必须听取所有各方的意见,包括那些支持当前形式拟议规则者的意见,以便机构能够充分理解修改规则的后果。Covington深入处理国际贸易和能源问题,完全有能力帮助想提交评论或可能质疑新规则会如何影响业务的客户。
太阳产业一直处在生存危机中,这是威胁对很大一部分美国征收回溯未来关税所触发的导入物2022年4月1日启动危机时商务部启动调查以确定柬埔寨、马来西亚、泰国和越南的太阳能电池和模块是否绕过中国太阳能电池的反倾销税这些国家的太阳能电池大都占美国约80%2020年太阳模块导入量 。
While rarely invoked, section 318(a) was recently used by President Trump to reduce certain burdens on the importation of personal protective equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic.[8] There are other examples of prior Administrations suspending imports tariffs under this provision.[9]
In addition to issuing the Declaration, President Biden invoked the Defense Production Act for solar cells and modules, as well as for: insulation, electric heat pumps, transformers (and electric grid components), electrolyzers, fuel cells, and platinum group metals.The White House indicated that the DPA Determination is intended to: accelerate domestic production of clean energy technologies, including solar panel parts and put the full power of federal procurement to work spurring additional domestic solar manufacturing capacity by directing the development of master supply agreements, including "super preference" status.[10]
The President's emergency action does not impact existing AD/CVD tariffs on imports of solar cells and modules from mainland China and Taiwan including such modules assembled in jurisdictions other than mainland China or Taiwan using cells from mainland China or Taiwan.
What Can We Expect from Commerce?
On the same day the Declaration was issued, Commerce issued a press release in which Secretary Raimondo indicated that Commerce "will issue regulations to temporarily permit for up to 24 months duty-free access to solar cells and modules from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam." The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Enforcement and Compliance, Lisa Wang, who is responsible for AD/CVD determinations, similarly stated: "no solar cells or modules imported from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam will be subject to new antidumping or countervailing duties during the period of the emergency."[11]
Commerce is expected to formalize the moratorium on these AD/CVD tariffs through a regulation.鉴于这一行动的紧急性质,商业界很可能在2022年8月29日初步判定日期前数日或数周发布这项条例而不通知和评论。
商业可能仍然发现柬埔寨、马来西亚、泰国和越南的太阳能电池和模块绕过AD和CVD订单,在这种情况下,关税估计在紧急段过期后开始应用。
Do这些行动解决美国危机太阳产业?
提供总统声明和商务声明,似乎极有可能在今后24个月内不向柬埔寨、马来西亚、泰国和越南的太阳能电池模块征收新的AD/CVD关税,无论规避调查结果如何宣言因此有可能产生关税可预测性,使美国太阳能产业需求继续输入太阳能电池模块太阳能电池生产者已经表示,他们正在考虑对暂停这些关税提出法律挑战上文指出,总统行动似乎与规约一致,法院通常在紧急情况下服从总统鉴此,这种法律挑战不太可能成功,而且由于通常需要时间提出这种挑战,也不太可能在商务8月初步判定前解决。太阳能产业在质疑AD/CVD收费的诉讼中,法院例行发布追溯性补救办法因此,在不大可能成功对《宣言》提出质疑的情况下,法院可追溯性地对太阳能电池和模块适用AD/CVD关税,特别是如果在任何诉讼未决期间采取程序步骤命令最终评估太阳能电池和模块关税。
在24个月紧急状态到期后进口关税水平方面比较不确定(或总统似乎不太可能结束紧急状态时更快)。商业发现规避后,从柬埔寨、马来西亚、泰国和越南等地对太阳能电池模块立即实施关税,目前尚不清楚该点可适用什么率。通常,外国出口商和生产者能够参加对AD/CVD指令的行政审查,以建立自己的公司特有收费率,而不是支付全局AD/CVD通用收费率,根据中国指令,总收费率约为250%(合并计算)。尚不清楚商务是否会允许东南亚国家出口商/生产商在紧急情况下参加评审,因为预计它们的商品在进口时不受关税约束。2024年中 假设紧急端太阳能产业发现极高AD/CVD收费威胁再次锐减美国太阳能电池和模块的供应市场
理解总统或商务对太阳能电池或对太阳能电池模块导入的潜在关税风险对贵公司很重要,Covington完全有条件提供帮助manbext网页版We have a group of attorneys who are well versed in these trade laws and have decades of experience helping clients navigate the tariff risks created by AD/CVD orders.
* * *
If you have any questions concerning the material discussed, please contact the following members of our International Trade and Energy practices: Shara Aranoff, Alexander Chinoy, William Isasi, Andy Jack, and Jay Smith.
[1] Letter from Sen.海因里希森Lujan RepStansbury和Repfernández呼叫Biden总统(5月9日2022日)。
[4] White House, Declaration of Emergency and Authorization for Temporary Extensions of Time and Duty-Free Importation of Solar Cells and Modules from Southeast Asia (June 6, 2022).
[5] White House, Memorandum on Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, on Solar Photovoltaic Modules and Module Components (June 6, 2022).
[6] White House, Memorandum on Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, on Solar Photovoltaic Modules and Module Components (June 6, 2022) ("the Secretary shall consider taking appropriate action under section 1318(a) of title 19, United States Code . . . .").
[7] (empahsis added) While the text of this provision references the "Secretary of the Treasury," the notes clarify that the provision today applies to the Secretary of Commerce who is the official that administers U.S.AD/CVD法例.
像世界多政府一样,英国政治目前似乎有些不稳定英国问题反映世界, 常有观点和信念突然不再是数十年来似乎不可推卸的确定性 。
davas两年来首次相遇本周,自由化经济、日益全球化和扩展民主在帮助数以百万计人民脱贫并向他们提供电、净水、食品和经济机会方面非常成功。
yet现在似乎接受该方法的普遍性正面临挑战,世界经济处于下滑边缘.Covid暴露了全球化世界的脆弱性-依赖原产中国供应链中联零响应非意外结果包括国家与世界经济其余部分隔绝、经济停顿并加重已经压力的供应链压力公司和国家正期望通过岸上或近岸生产计划缩短供应链,作为向未来可能中断打保的一种方式。对一些国家(特别是靠近欧洲的北非国家)来说,这一发展为人们提供了一个机会。对其他人来说,这意味着撤回投资和就业并失去开发契机
2月底Times发布一篇文章Perma-CrisisThe lengthy collapse of Syria into chaos and civil war, led to the rise of Isis. The horrific barbarity of that regime caused a refugee crisis which placed additional stress on the coherence of the European Union, which was at the same time trying to deal with the fallout of the 2016 Brexit vote. The world seemed hardly to have time to breathe before we were thrust into the depths of the coronavirus pandemic and then almost immediately the Russia-Ukraine crisis.This succession of crises has been attritional for global, national and individual resilience. Coffers were emptied to mitigate the worst impacts of lockdowns. Economies were shuttered. Companies furloughed. The economic rebound had already led to stretched supply chains and inconsistent cross-sector international supply of goods meant inflation was already on the way up – even before Russia invaded Ukraine…
And whilst world attention was focused on responding to the perma-crisis, inexorably global weather was deteriorating, caused by climate change and the slower than required energy transition, presenting an even greater threat to the established economic order and to developing countries' social, economic and political progress.IPCC警告说,如果有可能将全球变暖限制为2摄氏度,那就2020年代是应对气候变化的关键十年,更不用说1.5摄氏度了。
Whilst India和Pkistan在50摄氏度以上持续温度下烧烤,法国最近记录了其连续40天平均温度以上全法平均温度比标准高3摄氏度土壤饱和度0比1度测量水量年中这个时间法国平均土壤饱和度应为0.85:0.55这个问题,因为法国作为第六大小麦生产国,可在解决全球小麦短缺问题方面发挥重要的回旋生产作用。温度和缺雨意味着法国小麦收成已经下降10%:如果干旱再持续两星期,一些人预测将上升40%。
这些危机关联到可称为Estruce-Nexus俄罗斯入侵乌克兰暴露后共产主义世界秩序的脆弱性。 战争加深了Covid的影响并挑战自由市场资本主义促进全球发展和鼓励民主机构并通过贸易防止冲突的正统性。数国不愿谴责俄国入侵乌克兰(尤其是非洲)这一事实表明,它们可能充其量只是不愿意转而接受西方世界观华盛顿共识也许实际上只真正为那些政治和经济体系和相对财富相匹配的国家服务 。
这个结论也许还显示俄国乌克兰战争并非孤立异常化,而是持续更广泛地调整世界强国和政治控制体系并减少全球化的一部分甚至在Covid前,世界民粹主义政府都呈上升趋势 — — 将2008年金融危机和全球化持久经济创伤归结为失去经济机会和提供保护主义和孤立主义解决方案。
这一趋势很可能因即将到来的能源和粮食危机而加剧,这些危机将导致新的大规模从非洲迁移(自2016年以来面临严重粮食无保障并需要紧急粮食援助的总人数几乎翻了一番,现在全世界60%的饥民生活在冲突区 ) 。Migration which, in turn will further feed right-wing populism especially in Europe with a circular impact of protectionism and withdrawal of investment from countries seen as fragile or vulnerable, further accelerating economic slowdown in the same countries that are migration sources.And that is before we get onto the dangers of a global recession caused by the over-correction of central banks to inflationary pressures (six out of eight of the times the Fed has raised interest rates in response to inflation have resulted in a global recession…)
In all, conversations in Davos felt downbeat. Talk of recession merged with fears of a depression. The challenge to accepted norms flagging the fragility of the democratic, liberalized, globalized model of economic development with which we are familiar.
Against that backdrop, companies will need to plan carefully. Investments need to be calibrated against the risk of an economic slowdown/downturn and new market entry will have to be tested against emerging instability and uncertainty. Covington's mixed teams of public policy experts and legal and regulatory lawyers is ideally placed to help companies assess these risks and navigate an increasingly complicated and (possibly) disparate world.
As the world struggles to adjust to the harsh new reality of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the most recent instalment of the Sixth IPCC Report slipped out almost unnoticed. And that is worrying, since the assessment in this section of the Report is even starker than previous assessments – noting in particular that in order to avoid global temperatures increasing by greater than 1.5 degrees C above preindustrial levels, the world needs to halve its emissions this decade: a reduction that the world does not currently appear to be remotely on course to do.
However, whilst the IPCC Report and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are not linked, Russian aggression in Ukraine may serve as a catalyst to speed up the European energy transition and accelerate its retreat from dependency on Russian gas and exposure to volatile international oil markets, which could in turn deliver a more rapid reduction in European emissions. In the process, perhaps setting the world on a path to achieving an outcome that currently seems unattainable.
What is the IPCC Report?
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a panel of the world's leading climate scientists. The Panel publishes regular updates of global knowledge on the climate crisis.更新设计帮助政府决策。更新内容非常全面,每次需要5至7年完成The current Report is the Panel's Sixth Report since its establishment in 1988, and commentators have noted it may be the last to be published while there is still some chance of avoiding the worst impacts from climate change.
This Sixth Report is being released in four parts between August 2021 to October 2022. The first part examined the physical basis of climate science (how the atmosphere is changing – and will change – and whether human influence is responsible). The second part, which was released on 28 February, assesses the effects of climate change, such as extreme weather, droughts, floods and temperature rises, and how best to adapt to these changes[i].
What does the Second Part Say?
The conclusions of the most recent instalment of the Sixth Report make for sobering reading:
- The risks associated with lower levels of warming are greater than the previous 2014 IPCC adaptation assessment had concluded;
- The window to adapt to climate change is "brief and rapidly closing";
- The impacts on human systems, natural systems, and ecosystems are more widespread and accelerating;
- Ecosystems are reaching the limits of their ability to adapt to the changing climate, and the effectiveness of adaptation will decrease with increasing warming;
- Some losses are already irreversible;
- Sea-level rise is already inevitable, posing an existential threat for some small islands and increased vulnerability for infrastructure, including ports and energy systems;
- Up to 1bn people could be at risk from coastal flooding by 2060;
- Half the world's population live in areas that are "highly vulnerable" to climate change;
- Even at 1.5 degrees or less, 8% of current farmland will become unproductive.
Given that the world has already warmed by 1.1 degrees since the pre-industrial period and that there is a lag in the world's climate response to emissions, it is likely that the world will warm by 1.5 degrees within 20 years, even if deep greenhouse gas emissions cuts are achieved.COP26多次表示,本十年是决定性的十年:2030年前排放量必须减半,世界才有机会保持在1.5度以下变暖状态。
/p>若不将全球变暖限制在1.5度以下,将触发冰帽和冰川融化的灾难性链反作用增加野火和树死accelerating peatland dry-out and permafrost thaw – all of which would release additional carbon emissions further accelerating global warming.
The Report identifies five areas as priorities for future climate adaptation. One of those areas is the reform of energy systems, where the Report makes a number of recommendations:
- Energy generation diversification.
- Improved demand-side management through better storage, and energy efficiency.
- Climate responsive energy markets, smart-grids, robust transmission systems, and improved supply-deficits response capacity.
So How is the Russia-Ukraine Crisis Relevant?
A Commission Communication ("Joint European Action on Affordable, Secure and Sustainable Energy") was due for release on 2 March!however, the Commission has announced a delay to the publication in order to revise it in light of the Ukraine crisis. A leaked draft of the original Communication set out a number of recommendations that were very closely aligned to the IPCC Report recommendations set out above – though the Communication's conclusions were motivated as much by geopolitical and economic, as climate change factors.
It is likely that Putin's aggression in Ukraine will shift the focus of the redrafted Communication to an accelerated switch to renewables, which would also help deliver against the IPCC Report's demands. In his twitter feed, Commission Vice President Timmermans noted on 28 February: "It's time we tackle our own vulnerabilities.以闪电速度跳入可再生能源我们自己清洁廉价无穷能量越快移动,越快减少对他人依赖度,我们站在一起越强。
Whilst远非唯一文件显示欧盟通向2050NetZero目标,尽管即将修改,看通信初始草稿仍然有启发作用,它清楚地表明欧盟从依赖俄罗斯燃气向可再生能源过渡的方向。
EU40%的能源需求依赖俄罗斯燃气并承认迫切需要减少这种依赖度,甚至在俄国入侵乌克兰前都如此。文稿表示:“欧盟仍然高度依赖能源进口发电加热This is the case in particular as regards gas, where we rely on imports for 90% of our consumption… This dependency has aggravated the current situation of high energy prices."Even before the Ukraine crisis, the draft Communication was crystal clear on the dangers of European "dependence on a single supplier of fossil gas" demanding "diversification of gas supply and using the full potential of green and low carbon energy sources" including increasing the use of LNG to "reduce our dependence on imported Russian gas and strengthen security of supply."
The draft Communication argued that "[s]ustained high energy prices are impacting the entire economy….廉价燃气价格.使可再生清洁能源投资更有利可图,这意味着“快速清洁能源过渡需求从来就没有更强和清晰”,提高燃气价格缩短了“从易变化石燃料向更廉价可再生能源技术过渡的回溯时间.减少对进口依赖并推倒物价”。
通信草案以这一结论为基础,侧重于能源多样化的重要性通信草案反射气专委报告的结论,就如何增加使用太阳能和促进生物量和氢量生产提出若干建议文中称快速提高可再生发电能力“是我们能源向2050年去碳化过渡的关键”,并称它为“终端使用部门电气化和再生氢生产之工具”,并补充多样化是减少该大陆对俄罗斯天然气过度依赖的最有效方式。通信草案建议多项需求方响应,包括提高能效清除监管屏障加速天然气存储投资The motivation may be different – "to make Europe less vulnerable to fluctuations on the fossil fuel markets" – but the sense of urgency is the same "as soon as possible."
Once again, mirroring the IPCC's conclusions, the draft Communication proposed an "ambitious combination of funding and regulatory measures [to] accelerate the green transition." Although it does not feature in the original Communication, it would not be a surprise to see the amended version place an expanded role for nuclear power as a green alternative back on the agenda again – not least given the recent announcement by the German Government that they would consider postponing the decommissioning of German nuclear reactors as part of the national response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis.
Conclusion
Although perhaps reached for different reasons, the conclusions of the IPCC Report and the Commission are identical: an accelerated shift away from dependence on hydrocarbons for energy and an increased focus on the rapid deployment of renewable energy is essential. For the EU, the shift is necessary not only for climate change reasons, but also for its long-term political, economic and social well-being.
The EU was already heading down the renewables path: the Russian invasion of Ukraine will accelerate that process in the medium- to long-term and will force the EU to seek other sources of natural gas in the short-term. The process of seeking new sources of gas will have an impact on global gas prices, which will in turn further accelerate the global shift to an increasing reliance on renewable energy.
No one should be under any illusion that the energy transition will be rapid, pain-free, or easy, but the EU's experience with dependence on Russian gas demonstrates clearly one of the real geopolitical vulnerabilities of continuing to rely on the existing model.
Covington's mixed teams of regulatory and public policy experts are uniquely placed to advise clients on how to navigate the turbulent geopolitics of international relations and their impact on the energy transition.
We would be happy to discuss with you how these complicated inter-relationships may affect your company and your business.
[i] The report of the third working group, which will examine how to cut emissions, will be released at the end of the second quarter.第四即最后一次工作组报告综合其他三个工作组报告的结论,将于10月在COP27前发布-定于2022年11月举行。
In effect, the Commission's legislative Package is intended to promote the use of blue hydrogen until at least 2030 provided that it achieves the same decarbonization as green hydrogen (i.e., 70% GHG reduction). However, the European Parliament and Council may amend both the proposed definition and conditions of blue hydrogen and the proposed regulative incentives during their consideration of the Package and its adoption through the legislative procedure that will now follow. Moreover, the European Commission will be empowered to develop much of the methodologies implementing the definitions of blue and green hydrogen. Companies intending to engage in blue and green hydrogen operations in the EU/EEA would be well advised to closely follow these developments.
I. The Legislative Package on Hydrogen and Decarbonized Markets
The Package is yet another piece of the "Fit for 55" agenda to achieve the EU's climate neutrality by 2050 and includes three legislative proposals: (i) a proposal for a recast of the EU Regulation on the Internal Markets for Renewable and Natural Gases and for Hydrogen ("Proposed Gas and Hydrogen Regulation")!(二) 关于欧盟可再生能源和天然气及氢内部市场共同规则的建议(“ Both green and blue hydrogen would benefit from this proposed beneficial regulatory framework provided they comply with the proposed definitions and requirements. However, they would continue to be impacted differently under other parts of the EU's climate and energy rules, such as the Renewable Energies Directive ("RED II") and the proposal for a Regulation on a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ("Proposed CBAM Regulation") and the Regulation on the Establishment of a Framework to Facilitate Sustainable Investment ("Taxonomy Regulation"). II. Renewable and Low-Carbon Hydrogen The EU's current energy regulatory framework fails to define renewable (aka "green") and low-carbon (aka "blue") hydrogen. This legal uncertainty has hampered the role-out of green and blue hydrogen markets and infrastructure in the EU. To correct this, the Package introduces new legal definitions of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen that the Commission will be empowered to detail by adopting specific calculation methodologies and threshold determinations in delegated acts. The Proposed Gas and Hydrogen Directive includes definitions of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen that are in line with those of the proposal to amend the Renewable Energies Directive II ("Proposed Directive to Amend RED II"). 表示欧盟关于可再生(“绿化”)和低碳最大温室气体排放密度的规则大致相似,因为天然气和氢指令为两者都设置相同的去碳化效果标准(i.e. ,70%降温)。可再生和低碳氢减排阈值很可能使用“对开式”法计算,即计取勘探到生产过程的CO2排放,包括直到生产过程的运输,然而,委员会尚未确定绿色和蓝氢精确计算和测定方法(见下文)。 Thus建议可再生和低碳氢的主要差值将是氢生产过程,特别是用于制造氢的能源源(iem>e.g./em>电解器中)。In effect, the aim of this approach is to allow low-carbon hydrogen to play a role in decarbonization and facilitate the energy transition until 2030. The amended RED II would continue to promote green hydrogen, and various EU legislation, such as the Proposed CBAM Regulation, would likely impact blue and green hydrogen differently. However, both blue and green hydrogen meeting the proposed definitions would benefit from the Package's proposed dedicated hydrogen infrastructure and market outlined below at least until 2030. The expectation is that by 2030 the EU will introduce a stricter GHG reduction threshold for the definition of low-carbon ("blue") hydrogen. This threshold could be similar to that set under the draft technical screening criteria for gas investments under the Taxonomy Regulation, but that remains to be seen. III.低卡通氢元 可再生和低碳认证: Hence, if an operator provides compliance with a recognized scheme, this will serve to satisfy the certification requirement for low-carbon hydrogen. The Package applies these certification requirements equally to imported and EU-produced blue and green hydrogen, which may be related to recent efforts by certain Member States to scale up production of hydrogen both inside and outside the EU. For instance, in December 2021 the Commission approved the German State aid scheme H2Global that also supports the production of green hydrogen in non-EU countries for its export to, and sale in, the EU. IV. Regulation of Hydrogen Networks The current EU regulatory framework for gas energy carriers does not address the deployment of hydrogen as an independent energy carrier via dedicated hydrogen networks.欧盟一级没有基于收费价对氢网络投资规则(sem>/em>要求为网络运营商提供报酬以便充分投资于基础设施)或专用氢网络所有权和运营规则(sem>/em>unbunding规则)。拟议气流指令和拟议气流规范通过引入以下措施消除这些缺陷: Next Steps The European Parliament and Council must now consider the proposed Regulation and Directive for their adoption through the so-called "ordinary" legislative procedure. This procedure allows the Parliament and Council to modify the proposals, for example to include further incentives and more flexible rules for low-carbon hydrogen. The procedure is likely to be expedited so that the legislation is adopted within the next 18 months. In the meantime, the Commission is also expected to start its preparatory work on the specific methodologies needed for the certification of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen.委员会将不得不作出技术决策,这些决策往往可能产生重大商业后果。受影响的公司或愿尽早与委员会接触进程。
联合王国政府目前正在就潜在法律进行磋商。英国政府期望该法将特别影响超市和时装厂、肉和奶制品生产者和企业使用棕榈油和其他自然成份并提议立法可能为企业提供法律确定性和清晰义务。
联合王国政府拟议立法力求查禁非法砍伐森林和生态系统变化并补充生产国政府和企业当前举措联合王国政府在公告中强调森林保护在应对气候变化方面的重要性,并特别指出:
- deferation占全球温室气体排放量的11%;
- 估计80%森林砍伐由农产品生产产生并 大森林清除生产这些商品不被视为合法 。
博客文章中, 我们考虑拟议立法的范围和范围对企业内可能意味着什么, 并提供广义GRI建议和国际可持续性尽职驱动程序上的一些上下文.
建议目前侧重于大型企业,视营业量和雇员数而定。根据国际和国家会计法,法律可能遵循欧盟和联合王国将大型企业界定为非中小企业的其他环境与可持续性举措政府预期超市和时装厂最有可能受拟议立法的影响,此外还有“公司将农林产品或衍生产品投放英国市场”。确定哪些企业属于类似勤勉报告框架范围证明对许多企业来说复杂化,特别是那些公司结构复杂并正在扩展的企业。
政府打算确保立法增强并符合现有的英国非金融公司报表和尽职框架不遵守制裁仍有待确定,但当前高层次建议显示政府将能够对继续使用未合法生产/或未建立强力尽职体系的森林风险商品的企业课以罚款和其他民事制裁。
关键建议之一是引入强制克尽职责要求GRI建议中一些重要范围界定方面包括:
- 应有的注意义务应同时涵盖侵犯人权和环境风险和影响,这些风险和影响需要仔细和清晰地定义and
- obligations for companies should be commensurate with the size of the organisation, their impact and ability to influence change;
- the financial sector should also be covered by a similar mandatory due diligence obligation, undertaking due diligence in order to avoid their lending and investment activities funding deforestation.
The extent to which any eventual legislation will incorporate these suggestions is currently unclear.
The GRI also recommended the introduction of a legally binding target to end deforestation within UK agriculture and forestry supply chains as soon as practicable, by no later than 2030.
Next steps: consultation
The UK Government — in particular, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ("Defra") — has launched an online consultation on the draft legislation to solicit views from the UK and international stakeholders (closing on 5 October 2020).Feedback to the consultation will inform the Government's response to the GRI's due diligence recommendation, and assist in weighing the potential impacts of the proposed legislation on businesses and other interests.
If the Government decides to legislate, the intention currently seems to be to that the legal framework will be established in primary legislation, followed by more detailed secondary legislation, and subject to further consultation.
Wider context: the proliferation of due diligence obligations
Following the UN's adoption of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ("UNGPs"), there has been an increasing trend of national and regional regulatory initiatives, including human rights and environmental due diligence and reporting requirements.
One such significant initiative is in motion an at EU level.On 29 April 2020, the EU announced that it would introduce legislation in 2021 to make human rights and environmental due diligence mandatory for EU companies (see our May 2020 blog post here).欧洲议会目前正在编写关于这个问题的立法倡议报告,我们期望委员会在今后数月内进行协商。欧盟司法和消费者事务专员最近确认,委员会将将该条例列入2021年委员会下一个正式工作方案(预期于2020年10月发布)。These efforts are taking place in the context of the EU's wide suite of regulatory initiatives that are part of the "European Green Deal" (see an overview webinar here).
The UK Government considers that by introducing a mandatory deforestation and ecosystem supply chain law, it will provide businesses with some legal certainty by setting a "floor" and minimum standards to meet. However, against a backdrop of a rapidly evolving patchwork of due diligence requirements — including the more comprehensive, potential EU human rights and environmental due diligence regulation — it is possible that, for in-scope businesses, the UK's introduction of further issue-specific due diligence obligations will exasperate the compliance challenges caused by a piecemeal approach.
As described in an earlier post to this blog, the Commerce Department initiated an investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 into whether "laminations for stacked cores for incorporation into transformers, stacked and wound cores for incorporation into transformers, electrical transformers, and transformer regulators are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security."
The Commerce Department has requested public comments regarding the investigation. Interested parties may submit written comments, data, analyses or other information pertinent to the Commerce Department's investigation no later than June 9.万博体育app手机登录2020. Rebuttal comments are due by June 19, 2020.
This investigation should be of interest to electric utilities and other electricity suppliers, as well as other firms whose services require the use of electrical transformers.
Guidance for comments
The Federal Register announcement of the request for comments lists the following as topics that the Commerce Department is particularly interested in regarding "laminations for stacked cores for incorporation into transformers, stacked and wound cores for incorporation into transformers, electrical transformers, and transformer regulators" ("the Products"):
- Quantity of, or other circumstances related to, the importation of the Products;
- Domestic production and productive capacity needed for the Products to meet projected national defense requirements;
- Existing and anticipated availability of human resources, products, raw materials, production equipment, and facilities to produce the Products;
- Growth requirements of Products' industries to meet national defense requirements and/or requirements for supplies and services necessary to assure such growth including investment, exploration, and development;
- The impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of the Products' industries;
- The displacement of any domestic production of the Products causing substantial unemployment, decrease in the revenues of government, loss of investment or specialized skills and productive capacity, or other serious effects;
- National defense supporting uses of the Products including data on applicable contracts or sub-contracts, both past and current;
- Country of manufacture for the Products;
- Relevant factors that are causing or will cause a weakening of our national economy
The Federal Register notice also describes detailed requirements for submitting comments and rebuttal comments. The Commerce Department is allowed to take up to 270 days for the investigation, but it is not required to do so.
The Commerce Department on May 4, 2020, announced a new investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, examining whether "laminations for stacked cores for incorporation into transformers, stacked and wound cores for incorporation into transformers, electrical transformers, and transformer regulators are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security."
This investigation should be of interest to electric utilities and other electricity suppliers, as well as other firms whose services require the use of electrical transformers.
Section 232 and its process
Section 232 is a powerful tool.s/covcommunate.com/51/3165/uploads/covington-ward-Nation-security-Strigation-Steel-It survived a recent constitutional challenge, as we explained in this article.美国联邦巡回上诉法院维护法律合宪性,但该案原告American国际钢铁协会有请求最高法院审查Certiorari请求回复日期为2020年5月26日。
As规程要求BIS考虑以下因素:
- 国家安全和 替换家庭产品导致大量失业、政府收入下降、投资或专业技能及生产能力损失或其他严重影响。
规范要求商务部通知国防部调查,但不一定与国防部长“协调”。诚然,两省可以像第232节钢调查时那样,对适当的对策得出对立结论。
规则还要求BIS为行业提供提交评论的机会,并允许BIS公开听证虽然条例还允许商务在某些紧急情况下“破解或免去任何或全部程序”,但我们不期望商务引用这一例外公告明确指出商务为公众提供评论契机。
商务部允许花270天调查,但无需这样做离总统选举不到190天,政府可能拥有强大的政治动机加速调查2018年,由两党组成的Seel-stateServicesss/www.bround.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-portman-casey-ask-president-trump-to-proritize-el-eel-in-any-232trade所代表州-俄亥俄州和宾夕法尼亚州-是关键选战场,总统可能视调查为为向这些州选民提供经济利益的契机。