2类条款似乎是委员会调查焦点:
- Clauses 预防LNG货物移向欧盟内部替代目的地
- restricts rei/p>
2002年委员会调查NLNG尼日利亚天然气公司供应合同的领土销售限制5年后,它调查阿尔及利亚公司SonatrachLNG供应合同中的类似限制在上述两例中,委员会结束调查后,公司承诺删除LNG合同中的目的地条款。
事实上,委员会观察LNG部分已有相当长一段时间。ahrefss/ec.europa.eu/studies/follow-study-lng-sortage-strategy2017年6月,日本公平贸易委员会(JFC)结束全部门密集审查和辩论后得出结论,LNG供应合同中的目的地条款和转移限制和利润分享机制视相关合同条件而有可能或极有可能违反日本反垄断法不久后,韩国公平贸易委员会同样开始研究这些条款对竞争的影响。欧盟委员会和印度竞争委员会还去年与JFC签署了双边合作协议,旨在抑制LNG安排中问题目的地条款。
在前几例中,委员会较详细地审议了各类游戏安排和约束(目的地条款和潜在变异,如利润分享机制、隐式条件(FOB、DES、CIF等)),JFC2017年6月报告也进行了详细审议。无论其方法如何,都可公平假设委员会调查可能产生的影响远远超出本案特性并可能影响大LNG行业。
- restricts rei/p>
In agreements spanning 10 years or more, parties may have the ability to revise the contract price if there is a significant change in market circumstances.[3] For buyers and sellers of natural gas and LNG, it will be important to determine whether the recent trends are a long-term significant change that should be reflected in their price formulae.
The fall in oil prices has been stunning. As shown by the graph below, the Brent price has declined by approximately 50 per cent, from over $110 per barrel in June 2014 to just under $60 dollars today.
British prices are 30 per cent lower than on the same date last year. The Henry Hub price, long-considered a proxy for the price of natural gas in the U.S.,[4] is down approximately 49 per cent over the last year.
In these circumstances, buyers under long-term gas and LNG sales agreements may believe that the formula in their contract is not reflecting the extent of the change in oil price, while sellers may believe that the same formula is over-reflecting the change. As a result, either party to the contract may seek to change the price formula to reflect alleged changes in circumstances.
Parties may hotly dispute whether it is appropriate to revise the price formula. The party seeking to change the contract price must usually demonstrate a need to revise the formula by satisfying a test or standard set out in the contract.通常称它为触发器 。例如协议条件可能要求一方显示能源市场发生了重大变化 。
The causes of the recent trends, and whether these trends are long-term realities, are a matter of debate among economists. Some argue that a decision by OPEC to drive American shale oil producers out of the market has impacted the balance of supply and demand and is only temporary. Others identify weak global economic activity as the primary explanation.并重新评估市场对物价的影响对其他人来说 美国dollar's recent appreciation is a key factor.
In the current circumstances, parties contemplating a potential price review should consider these recent trends with a wary eye on the trigger of their price review clause. Showing "change" alone is seldom, if ever, adequate. Parties must frequently show that the change is lasting. This can be a high hurdle. While it is easy to evaluate what has already occurred, it can be difficult to project that these changes will continue to impact oil prices and/or gas markets in the future. For parties considering a price review, it will be important to consider each of the possible economic explanations and determine whether they are significant, lasting changes. The answer may be worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
[1] See our post from October 2014 on the implications of a falling oil price on energy sector investments.
[2] This description is a very simple explanation of how gas pricing formulae work. The reality is much more complex. Formulae vary widely and can include variables for a range of other energy types, inflation and other market forces.
[3] See our previous post for a primer on long-term gas supply contracts.
[4] This thinking may be changing as gas production in other regions of the United States becomes more prevalent.
[5] This is simply one example. Price review provisions in long-term agreements vary and there is no typical clause.
This decision has been highly criticised by the Nigerian arbitration community, as it appears to have no basis in Nigeria's Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004 ("ACA"). This decision may undermine many of the positive steps taken by Nigeria in recent years to establish itself as one of the more arbitration-friendly jurisdictions in Africa.
Statoil and Texaco, the appellants in Statoil, were one of several oil consortia to have initiated arbitration proceedings against the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation ("NNPC"). These arbitrations concerned the payment of "petroleum tax" on oil lifted under production sharing contracts ("PSC") dating back to 1993. Initially, the NNPC had obtained a court injunction against the arbitration proceedings on the grounds that tax disputes were not arbitrable under Nigerian law. However, the injunction was subsequently overturned by the Lagos Court of Appeal[1] in July 2013.
As a further attempt to frustrate the arbitration, the Federal Inland Revenue Service ("FIRS") applied to the courts to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement between Statoil, Texaco and the NNPC. Counsel for the FIRS argued that the purpose of the arbitration was to avoid the proper computation of taxes accruable to its account, stating that:
"[t]he whole game ...was to exclude the [FIRS] from the clandestine arrangement in the Arbitration Tribunal so that in the event the award is made, as it is evident that the tribunal is rail-roaded and programmed for that purpose, the [FIRS] as the Central and component part of the Government of the Federation, will be compelled to disgorge revenues already and severally collected, and allocated, which will form part of the awards to be eventually made by the Arbitral Tribunal."
The Abuja Court of Appeal agreed and confirmed that FIRS had locus standi to make such a challenge, despite the fact that it was not party to the agreement itself. In its decision, the Court of Appeal noted that if the claimants were successful with their claim, the FIRS would lose tax revenue and therefore would be affected by the outcome of the arbitration. With this in mind, Tine Tur J of the Abuja Court of Appeal stated:
"[i]f a party to an arbitral agreement can challenge the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal, or that the arbitral agreement was ab initio, null and void, what about a person or authority, such as the [FIRS], who was not a party to the agreement but complains ...that the proceedings or subsequent award by an arbitral tribunal constitute an infringement of some provisions of the Constitution or the laws of the land or impede her constitutional and statutory functions or powers? Would the person be debarred from seeking declaratory remedies, or by originating summons? I do not think so. Where there is a proved wrong, there has to be a remedy."
Neither the ACA nor any other Nigerian statute suggests that the courts have the power to allow third parties to challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement or the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Indeed, the decision appears to contradict Section 34 ACA, which provides that "a Court shall not intervene [in arbitral proceedings] in any matter governed by this Act except where so provided in this Act." While the reasoning in the judgment is difficult to follow, it appears that Tine Tur J, on identifying a perceived wrong, considered it necessary to remedy such a wrong, regardless of whether or not statute allows for such a remedy.
The court issued its decision despite the fact that the arbitration was still pending.In the words of Tine Tur J :
"I am of the humble opinion that it will be in the best interest of the [FIRS] not to wait or stand by for the Arbitration Tribunal to complete the proceedings and make an award. [The FIRS] has the locus standing to act timeously to arrest the situation by a declaratory action or originating summons in a Court of Law. Where the claim succeeds, the Court may make a declaration that the arbitral agreement was void ab initio or that the Arbitral Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to have entertained the dispute on grounds of constitutional or statutory illegality etc."
The decision is particularly damaging to international arbitration in Nigeria, as it conflicts with two arbitration-friendly Nigerian Court of Appeal decisions from July 2013[2] and February 2014[3].These decisions had upheld the principle of non-intervention as set out in Section 34 ACA. In these decisions the Court of Appeal had overturned injunctions seeking to restrain arbitral proceedings, relying on Section 34 ACA and holding that the courts had no power under the ACA to restrain arbitral proceedings with an ex-parte injunction. Such conflicting decisions create an unpredictable environment for arbitration.
Despite the recent decision of Statoil, Nigeria has taken positive steps to establish a suitable legal framework for international arbitration. The ACA, enacted in 2004, is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law and the Lagos Court of Appeal has confirmed that foreign arbitral awards will be enforced directly in Nigeria under Section 51(1) ACA and the New York Convention.[4]
However, the decision in Statoil, which appears to have been based on the whims of the judge in question rather than the applicable arbitration law, shows that arbitration in Nigeria remains unpredictable. Therefore, parties looking to invest in Nigeria should be aware of these risks when negotiating the dispute resolution clauses of their agreements.
[1] The Nigerian Court of Appeal has 16 regional divisions, each with equal authority. The Abuja Court of Appeal and Lagos Court of Appeal are two of these regional divisions.
[2] Statoil (Nigeria) Ltd & Anor v.尼日利亚国家石油公司 & 2 Others ( 2014NWLR(Part 1373)1),2013年7月12日由拉各斯分院上诉法院裁决。
确保面向非洲交易和投资投资阶段清晰周全的仲裁协议应鼓励有效仲裁程序,如果争议解决后阶段证明有必要的话。
i仲裁协议内容一般需要基于每项特定投资或交易的分析,以及当事方对所期望的争端解决机制的要求。起草仲裁协议时,投资者必须仔细考虑后来可能影响任何仲裁程序成功的各种因素,包括选择机构仲裁或特设仲裁以及仲裁的所在地和地点。
/p如果机构仲裁优先选用,则各方有多机构从中选择多方仍然选择长期常设机构,如ICC近数十年来建立了若干区域机构,如撒哈拉以南非洲仲裁中心,包括南部非洲仲裁基金会(AFSA)、伦敦国际仲裁院和毛里求斯国际仲裁中心(LCIA-MIAC)以及普通法院和仲裁中心(CCJA)。中心仿照迪拜高成功DIFCLCIA仲裁中心建立,设在毛里求斯,处于非洲境外金融企业核心LCIA-MIAC框架是创新型框架,原因不在于常设仲裁法院(海牙)而不是国家法院是该机构的默认指定机构,而常设仲裁院在LCIA-MIAC有常驻代表。日期尚早,但LCIA-MIAC预计将成为非洲相关争议首选仲裁中心事务和投资与非洲相关时,各方可选择将仲裁置于非洲国家中心或相关非洲管辖范围外。
选择仲裁座次时,必须考虑一国的国内法有些国家的国内仲裁法基于或包括贸易法委员会“模范法”,另一些国家则通过了自己的仲裁规约,其中一些几乎不提及仲裁庭的一般权限。投资人应谨慎行事,不要置仲裁权于仲裁法未解决或含混状态中。
地点可以是仲裁所在地的替代地点,有可能为参与程序者节省时间和费用,同时允许当事各方商定仲裁地点,为当事方提供最有吸引力程序优异条件。执行阶段
撒哈拉以南非洲像其他区域一样执法成功取决于特定国家法院的做法。
在一个已批准《承认及执行仲裁裁决纽约公约》(《纽约公约》)的国家执行仲裁裁决从理论上讲应相对简单易行。纽约公约是一个支持执行机制,根据该机制,除有限情形外,缔约国必须承认和执行外国仲裁裁决。近些年来,一些新的撒哈拉以南非洲国家加入了《纽约公约》。举例说,布隆迪今年初成为/p>While国家法院有时展示支持仲裁方法执行裁决,案例法前后不一,复杂因素组合影响执法是否有效。Covington发布单行指南“ahrf='''http://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/4760-test>>>/a>.Oil prices have plunged in the last few months. For example, Brent futures traded at over $110 per barrel in June, and fell below $85 last week. This is a fall of over 20%, and the market price for crude oil is now at its lowest level since 2010.
Oil prices impact activities in the sector and, in particular, the investments that upstream operators choose to make. Some means of producing oil cost more than others, and producers continually seek to reduce the marginal cost of production. For example, as recently reported by the Financial Times, studies estimate that the median North American tight oil development needs a crude oil price of $57 per barrel to break even. This threshold price compares to $70 per barrel one year ago. The situation is similar for production from Canadian oil sands, for which the average break-even cost is reportedly between $63 and $65 per barrel. A sustained drop in oil prices may provide a renewed focus on reducing costs and keeping these unconventional projects economically viable.
The implications for long-term projects with costs that cannot be scaled are potentially more worrying.Certain projects — for example, oil field developments, pipeline transportation, or other investments tied to the price of oil, such as LNG liquefaction trains or re-gasification terminals — can be dependent on expected oil and gas prices. When the oil price deviates outside of an anticipated range for an extended period of time, the economics of a project can change and it can create legal disputes (e.g., between co-venturers or between the investment company and supporting service providers). A fluctuating oil price can also encourage a government to change the rules of the game, which can also lead to litigation.
There are ways of mitigating these risks. When circumstances permit, some operators may try to include legal provisions in their contracts that anticipate potential changes in the energy markets, such as hardship clauses that shift some of risk of price changes to others. Frequently, legal disputes center on how these provisions should be applied. Depending on the law of the contract, there may also be legal doctrines that can be of assistance (e.g., bouleversement and imprévision, civil law concepts that can sometimes provide relief in the case of a supervening change in circumstances). Stabilisation clauses and investment treaty protections can sometimes be relied on to remedy actions taken by the government.
In short, a falling oil price may be helpful for the global economy, but it can create unwanted headaches for participants in the oil and gas sector and, potentially, give rise to litigation.
/gazprom.com/press/news/2014/jone/article3194/'>>Gazprom 和ahrf='http://www.naftogaz.com/www/3/nakweben.nsf/0/419E3C3C184862C2257CFA3426?OpenDocument&y=2014&month=News&'>Naftogaz KP日期为2009年1月19日(“契约”),Gazprom和Naftogaz之间10年长期天然气销售协议,量从每年400至520亿立方公尺不等。依据各方发布的声明,Gazprom似乎将提出债务索赔。Naftogaz似有可能引用物价审查规定并求降价争议值超过45亿美元。
解决争议,法庭可能需要考虑合同中的价格审查规定定价条件和物价审查规定保密,很少披露ahrfss.com/heren/articles/2009/01/30/9309445-2-separate-contracts-were假设Ukrainskayapravda所公布的合同包含与Naftogaz和Gazprom当前仲裁相关的物价审查规定,则法庭需要解释一些异常条件。
Ukrainskayapravda发布合同中的价格审查规定要求仲裁庭判定燃料和能源产品市场是否有实质性变化契约似未明文定义市场法庭需要确定哪些市场数据应评估以确定是否有实质性变化定义市场可能会引起争议Gazprom提供几乎全部进口天然气,乌克兰已开始实现能源供应多样化一些欧洲能源公司最近开始通过波兰和匈牙利向乌克兰提供逆流气来自乌克兰境外市场的数据可能相关仲裁庭需要判定是否允许根据物价审查条款考虑乌克兰境外市场的数据 。
Ukrainskayapravda发布合同条件还要求仲裁庭判定物价公式产生的价格是否反映“市场价”。合同没有具体说明确定市场价格的任何方法万博体育app手机登录简言之,Ukrainskaya Pravda发布的价格审查条款为法庭提供了很少引导和极大程度的裁量权。这使过程更加复杂并有可能增加结果不确定性签订长期天然气供应合同的各方应认真注意从中可汲取的教益。
.适当考虑物价审查规定是关键,有助于限制物价审查仲裁中的不确定性。关于现代长期天然气供应协议中起草选项及其他定价和争端解决考虑的更多信息,.s/p>现下文对现代长期天然气供应协议中定价规定结构提出一些想法。复杂定价规定是长期商品合同的共同特征在长期天然气销售协议中,协议条件定价通常不切实际,因为价格随时间推移而变化的竞争力没有一个单一定价术语或指数可供各方通用参考正因如此,各方通常会商定一个包含数变量的定值物价公式公式变量由双方在合同谈判期间商定可变量可表示替代能源、中心价、系数以抵消通货膨胀影响或降低汇风险或各方认为可能影响协议下售天然气价值的任何其他因素。
没有标准物价审查条款,规定的范围和效果因合同而异差异很大变化原因多有,从所涉方背景到相关天然气市场环境不等。但尽管没有锅炉板定价规定,但有一些泛泛趋势。通常只允许当事方在合同有效期内某些时段和/或数次启动物价审查举例说,许多长期天然气供应合同具体规定,任何一方只能每三年启动一次价格审查。部分协议还将包括数量有限的附加物价审查,缔约方可在任何时候启动整个协议期(有时称作“jokers”)。物价审查条款除限制一方启动物价审查外,还常常要求当事方说明需要物价审查的理由这有时被称为“触发器”。可要求一方证明发生了“重大变化”,相关能源市场发生了有意义的变化或公式产生的价位为“市场外”。
E万博体育app手机登录物价审查规定有时为这一点提供指导并列出客观测试或标准拟满足举例说,有些协议要求一方证明价格公式不再产生“可市场化价格”,并显示拟议修订价格公式将如何更好地满足这一指标。
推理,价格审查条款还包含试图限制定价争议范围的措辞。举例说,由于气值因市场而异,有时混淆市场数据应考虑在某些合同中,价格审查规定指示当事人只考虑特定能源市场的变化(无论是区域或国家)。缔约方有时还包含术语识别物价公式的意向或目的并明确说明选择某些变量的原因举例说,合同条件可具体规定煤价指数化意在表示电力市场竞用能源或燃料油指数化意在表示工业市场竞用能源万博体育app手机登录值得注意的是,随着欧洲天然气市场自由化的进展并产生天然气对天然气竞争,价格公式和价格审查规定日益常见地明确指中产物和自由化的影响。
长期天然气供应合同方面临的挑战是商定价格审查条件,这些条件泛泛足以适应市场意外变化,但具体性足以向当事方或仲裁庭提供足够指导各种选项可供选择,各方的写法选择可影响未来定价争议的规模和复杂性。适当考虑物价审查规定是关键并可有助于限制物价审查仲裁中的不确定性。