Congestion pricing is both a simple and somewhat radical idea: motorists will begin to pay to use a resource – roads – that had previously been free (at point of use).  Congestion pricing schemes vary based upon the details of their implementation, but they have so far exhibited a few common characteristics: first, the fees are dynamic, and fluctuate based on traffic (i.e., motorists pay more during peak hours, and less at night and on the weekends)!第二 通过物价筹集的收入 重新投入改善系统交通资产and third, success has been measured as a metric of reduced time in traffic, and reduced air pollution from transportation.

Congestion pricing is innovative in part because it has flipped the traditional transportation debate on its head.  Instead of focusing on the supply side (i.e., building more road surface), congestion pricing forces us to think about the demand side (i.e., more efficiently using the roads we have).  Research has shown that increasing supply merely serves to "induce" more demand, and does not, over time, solve the traffic problem.  Induced demand is the simple economic idea that creating more of a cheaper resource encourages its consumption.  In the highway context, therefore, adding road supply serves, over time, to generate more traffic in areas where supply has been added.  Perhaps the most famous example of this can be found in Houston, where the Katy Freeway, which was widened in a $2.8 billion project to a record-setting 26 lanes to address traffic, has actually experienced increased congestion.  As the economist Anthony Downs stated in his Law of Peak-Hour Expressway Congestion, on urban expressways, peak-hour traffic congestion rises to meet maximum capacity.  Traffic, on the other hand, serves as a natural traffic equilibrium: people opt to use alternative routes when the "cost" of traffic becomes too high.

Other sectors of the economy have experimented with demand-side pricing for a long time.  For example, in the electricity sector, regulators have encouraged innovation in time-of-use (TOU) pricing, which allows utilities to curb demand at peak hours by pricing electricity in accordance with demand.  And some entrepreneurs have used TOU pricing to generate greater energy efficiency and demand response opportunities through behavioral demand response programs.  Congestion pricing for vehicle traffic promises to create a similar market for efficiency – and to raise revenues for public transit in the process.

In New York, a number of program design features have been outlined, and some remain unresolved.  The proposed congestion pricing zone will be in Manhattan, below 60th Street.  Based on the state's goal to raise $1 billion per year from traffic fees, drivers will likely pay between $12 and $14 for cars, and around $25 for trucks during peak hours!fees will be less on nights and weekends.  And some drivers may receive credits for tolls entering the city from elsewhere.  Not everyone will have to pay, and the process of determining exemptions (for example, for people living inside the congestion zone, or for low-income New Yorkers) will occupy much of the implementation debate in the coming years.  And the fees will likely be assessed using existing technology (e.g., E-ZPass) and infrastructure, and through new cameras and sensors throughout the City.

In London, analysis has shown that its congestion charge has reduced traffic by 30% and improved air quality (17% reduction in NOx emissions, 24% reduction in PM10 emissions, and 3% reduction in carbon emissions).  The program has been so successful in reducing emissions that policymakers in London are now doubling down on their congestion pricing scheme with an extra pollution charge for vehicles out of emissions standards compliance in the London Ultra Low Emission Zone (vehicles that meet certain emissions standards are entitled to a discount under the program).  Results in Stockholm and Singapore have shown similar benefits, and in Stockholm, public opinion polling has shown that the program has become very popular.

This is perhaps why, even before New York City formally begins its program, other major American cities are considering following suit.  Los Angeles recently concluded a study indicating that a $4 fee to enter a 4.3 square-mile areas during weekday rush hour could reduce traffic by more than 20%.  And San Francisco is investing half a million dollars into a study on downtown congestion pricing, which will inform a plan to implement congestion pricing through road tolls.  Californians have raised some concerns that road pricing could have regressive economic impacts for low-income motorists who drive long distances to reach their place of employment.  But some studies have shown that, through discounts and exemptions, congestion pricing policies can work to protect and even help low-income drivers.

In November, the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CoJ") held once again that NGOs and persons directly concerned may bring legal actions before national courts against EU Member States that fail to comply with EU mandatory environmental standards.  The CoJ's decision (CJEU, C-404/13) concerned the UK government's failure to adopt adequate plans to ensure compliance with ambient air limits for nitrogen dioxide ("NO₂") in sixteen zones, including London.  The CoJ instructed the UK Supreme Court to adopt "any necessary measure" on the UK government to establish plans that demonstrate how it will comply with the limits for NO₂ within a period that should be as short as possible.

The CoJ's decision establishes an important precedent for a possible wave of legal challenges to force national authorities to limit NO₂ and benzene pollution in large cities across Europe.It is also an important precedent for national litigation in those Member States that fail to comply with EU environmental legislation that requires them to achieve a certain result, even if the Commission has not taken legal action against such national non-compliance.

Thus, the case confirms that environmental NGOs have a powerful litigation route of action as an alternative to the current political context in Brussels where environmental policy does not seem to be among the priorities of the new European Commission.

Background

Directive 2008/50/EC on Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe ("the Directive") establishes limits on specified air pollutants.  It requires Member States to divide their territory into agglomerations and zones in order to manage air quality in their territory.  Article 13 of the Directive then provides that Member States "shall ensure" that the levels of sulphur dioxide, PM₁₀, lead and carbon monoxide in ambient air do not exceed specified limits in those agglomerations and zones.  Article 13 also states that in those agglomerations and zones the specified limit values of NO₂ and benzene "may not be exceeded."

The Directive, however, provides exemptions for Member States.  Article 23 states that where the levels of pollutants in ambient air exceed the limits in a zone or agglomeration, Member States must adopt air quality plans in order to achieve the required limits.  More specifically, Article 22 states that if the limit values for NO₂ or benzene cannot be achieved, Member States may postpone the applicable deadlines for a maximum period of five years provided that they adopt an air quality plan in accordance with Article 23 that also includes specific information demonstrating how the limits will be achieved before the new deadline.  Article 22 also provides that Member States must notify their plan to the Commission, who may require adjustments or the adoption of a new plan.

The case concerned 16 zones of the United Kingdom that did not comply with the limits for NO₂ by the established deadline of 2010 and for which the UK government adopted a plan in accordance with Article 23, but did not notify to the Commission a plan showing how it would achieve the limits by 2015 (i.e., five years after 2010) in accordance with Article 22.  The NGO ClientEarth requested the UK government to show how it intended to ensure compliance with the limits of NO₂ in the 16 zones by 2015 in accordance with Article 22.  It should be noted that the Commission had not commented on the fact that the UK had failed to notify any plan in accordance with Article 22 for those 16 zones.

The CoJ's Decision

• Hard Limits for NO₂ and Benzene:  The CoJ started its reasoning by making clear that the limits for NO₂ and benzene are mandatory values for which Member States have no discretion.  The Court distinguished the wording "may not be exceeded" for NO₂ and benzene from that of  "shall ensure" for the other air pollutants of Article 13 of the Directive.  The CoJ held that the wording "may not be exceeded" amounts to an obligation on Member States "to achieve a certain result."

• Violation Despite Existence of Quality Plans:  Thereafter, the CoJ held that, where a zone or agglomeration does not meet the mandatory limit values for NO₂ or benzene, the Member State concerned must submit an application for an extension of the deadlines that includes a plan demonstrating how it will achieve conformity with the limit values before the new deadlines.  The CoJ also clarified that the "notification" procedure provided in Article 22 should be interpreted as an application procedure to the Commission.Moreover, the CoJ distinguished the plans of Article 22 from those regulated in Article 23 of the Directive.  It held that, where a Member State cannot comply with the limit values for NO₂ or benzene, in contrast with other regulated air pollutants, it is not sufficient to adopt a plan in accordance with Article 23.  Instead, Article 22 requires that the plan demonstrate how the limits values will be achieved and be submitted to the Commission.

• Remedies:  Most importantly, contrary to the doubts expressed by the UK courts, the CoJ held that natural or legal persons directly concerned by the limit values for NO₂ must be in a position to require the competent authorities, if necessary by bringing a legal action, to establish an air quality plan that demonstrates how the limit values for NO₂ will be achieved.The CoJ recalled its long standing case-law by which "individuals are entitled, as against public bodies, to rely on the provisions of a directive which are unconditional and sufficiently precise."  According to the CoJ, national courts should interpret their national laws in a way that are compatible with EU environmental directives, and when such interpretation is not possible, they must disregard national rules that are incompatible with the directives.  This supremacy of EU law also means that individuals should be able to take legal action in national courts, which must take "any necessary measure" to ensure compliance with the EU environmental law.  In effect, individuals may take legal action even if the Commission did not react to the Member State's non-compliance.

Impact

In the current political context where environmental policy may no longer be among the top priorities in Brussels, the CoJ's decision is an important reminder that environmental NGOs have an alternative means of action to achieve their objectives.  The Court confirms that NGOs and interested parties may sue local authorities in national courts even if, due to political or other reasons, the Commission fails to take legal action against Member States that do not comply with EU environmental law.  The decision seems to follow pattern of recent cases in which the EU Courts are reminding us of the potential implications of EU environmental law, and could start a potentially significant wave of environmental litigation across Europe.  Ironically, businesses in Europe could face an increase of the effective costs of environmental compliance during the next years.