2018年6月21日，欧盟委员会("委员会")启动了一项新的调查，以确定卡塔尔石油公司与欧洲买家的液化天然气(" LNG ")供应合同中的所谓目的地条款是否违反了欧盟("欧盟")反垄断规则。

调查是在全球重新关注这些条款和液化天然气交易条件的监管背景下进行的。此前，欧盟委员会对俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司(Gazprom)使用的类似条款进行了长达7年的调查，尽管是在不同的管道供应天然气市场。

确保整个欧盟的能源供应自由流动长期以来一直是委员会能源议程的重中之重，也是该部门执法活动的重点。欧盟委员会认为，液化天然气是通过管道供应天然气的一个有希望的替代方案。从这个意义上说，这项新的调查是一个明确的信号，即如果欧盟监管机构发现在整个欧盟范围内获得液化天然气供应的任何有问题的障碍，就会有意进行干预。

两类条款似乎是委员会调查的重点:

• 条款防止液化天然气货物转移到欧盟内的其他目的地;限制欧盟进口商可以将货物重定向到欧盟其他地方的领土或他们可以在欧盟内重定向的货物量条款。

这些条款也被称为“目的地条款”，欧盟委员会担心它们会阻碍卡塔尔石油公司的液化天然气在欧盟内部的自由流动。这些担忧并不新鲜。

2002年，欧盟委员会调查了尼日利亚天然气公司NLNG供应合同中的地域销售限制。五年后，它调查了阿尔及利亚Sonatrach公司液化天然气供应合同中的类似限制。 In both cases, the Commission ended its investigation after the companies committed to remove the destination clauses from their LNG contracts.

This new investigation thus comes as no surprise. In fact, the Commission had been observing the LNG sector for quite a while. Last year, the Commission published the results of its study into LNG and Storage Strategy, in which it identified destination clauses as a significant obstacle to LNG trade and the development of a fully-integrated EU energy market.

This new investigation must also be seen in the context of heightened antitrust scrutiny of LNG supply flows globally. In June 2017, concluding an intense sector-wide review and debate, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”) concluded that destination clauses and diversion restrictions and profit-sharing mechanisms in LNG supply contracts were likely or highly likely to violate the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act depending on the terms of the contract in question. Shortly thereafter, the Korean Fair Trade Commission likewise started looking into the effects of these clauses on competition. The Commission and the Indian Competition Commission also signed bilateral cooperation agreements with the JFTC last year that aim at curbing problematic destination clauses in LNG arrangements.

In this toughening antirust regulatory context, it remains to be seen how the commercial complexities of the LNG sector and concerns about the EU’s security of supply of gas will play out in the Commission’s analysis. In previous cases, the Commission had considered in some detail the types of arrangements and restrictions at play (destination clauses and potential variations such as profit sharing mechanisms, incoterms (FOB, DES, CIF), etc.), as did the JFTC in its June 2017 report. Regardless of its approach, it is fair to assume that the Commission’s investigation may have implications that will go well beyond the specificities of this case and could impact the wider LNG industry.